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DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: AN
APPROACH TO SOLVING SOUTH KOREA'S LABOR
PROBLEMS
Jeffrey F. Dickerman
Abstract: When Korea' became a democracy in 1987, Korea's militant labor
movement erupted into a series of nationwide protests and explosive labor strikes. As a
consequence, Korea's new democratic government enacted progressive labor laws aimed
at increasing wages and improving working conditions for laborers. However, these new
progressive labor laws lowered the productivity of businesses. Consequently, many
Korean goods could no longer compete in the global market and Korean businesses faced
bankruptcy. Tension now exists between Korean businesses and workers as each side
attempts to regulate the Korean workweek. The competing interests between business
and workers can be balanced by domestic technological innovation in Korea. Currently,
Korean business imports expensive technology for its goods from other countries.
Businesses often pay high royalty fees and enter into costly direct licensing agreements to
get this technology. By creating technology domestically, Korean business can lower the
amount of expensive technology it imports, earn higher profits, and still allow Korean
workers to keep many of the rights given to them under the democratic government's
progressive new labor laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
While most of Korea slept during the cold, early morning hours of
December 26, 1996, 154 legislators of the ruling New Korean Party held a
secret, emergency session of the National Assembly.2  These legislators
departed from four different Seoul hotels where they secretly chartered
buses to the National Assembly Building in order to convene an emergency
6 A.M. session. 3  Without the knowledge or presence of opposing
For the purpose of this Comment, "Korea" will refer to the Republic of South Korea.
2 Kim Moody, Korean Workers Show How to Handle a Conservative Congress, DIGNITY IN
LABOUR (visited Feb 12, 2000) <http:/www.citinv.itlassociazioni/CNMS/archivio/lavoro/kor..workers.
html>. The New Korean Party is a political party in Korea and is the product of a 1990 merger between the
ruling party and the New Democratic Party. Kim Young Sam, THE HUTCHINSON ENCYCLOPEDIA (1999)
(visited Mar. 27, 2000) <http://ukdb.web.aol.com/hutchinson/enclyclopedia/21MOO25721.htm>. The
National Assembly is Korea's legislature, which consists of individual Members, the Leadership, the
Plenary, the Committees, the Negotiation Groups, and the administrative bodies for legislative assistance.
For a detailed explanation of the organization and powers given to the National Assembly see The National
Assembly Library (1988) (visited Mar. 27, 2000) <http://node3.assembly.go.kr:6060/englishlintroductionl
organization.html>.
3 Sangwon Suh & Laxmi Nakarmi, Sneak Attack at Dawn: Union Protests Against Labor Law
Reforms Threaten to Bring the Nation-and the Economy-to a Standstill, ASIAWEEK, Jan. 10, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7755574.
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legislators,4 the New Korean Party passed eleven bills in just six minutes.5
The entire operation was covert and meticulously planned.6
Controversial labor reform bills passed during this pre-dawn session
spawned a nationwide labor strike that crippled Korea's economy. The
labor reform bills gave employers greater freedom to lay off employees, to
replace existing employees with temporary workers, to replace striking
workers with new hires, and to keep Korea's most militant labor unions
illegal.7 Reaction to the National Korean Party's passage of the labor reform
bills was swift and furious. Leaders from both the radical Korean Federation
of Trade Unions and the moderate Federation of Korean Trade Unions called
for a nationwide protest strike.8  Over 100,000 workers responded
immediately, 9 and by early January hundreds of thousands of workers were
on strike.' 0 The unions demanded that these "evil laws" be repealed and
asked the ruling New Korean Party to step down from office. 1
Meanwhile, the strikes inflicted serious damage on Korea's struggling
economy. By January 8, 1997 the nationwide protest strikes had already
cost Korea about 1.3 trillion won (approximately 1.54 billion U.S. dollars)1 2
in production losses, and an additional 266 million dollars in export losses. 13
The protest strikes impacted Korean manufacturing companies, domestic
services, and Korean telecommunication institutions. 14  For example, the
strikes forced Hyundai Motor Company, Korea's largest carmaker, to scale
back production of its automobiles from 5400 to about 400 cars per day.' 5
4 Moody, supra note 2.
5 Suh & Nakarmi, supra note 3.6 See generally id.
, Moody, supra note 2.
8 Suh & Nakarni, supra note 3.
9 Moody, supra note 2.10 David Holly, S. Korean Strikes in Crucial Phase, Analysts Say Asia: President Kim Rejects
Unions' Demand to Scrap New Law Making It Easier to Lay Off Workers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1997, at
A12. It is estimated that 610,000 Korean workers walked off their jobs during the peak of the strike.
Teresa Watanabe, S. Korean Strikes Widens, Threatens to Cripple Nation Asia: Union Leaders Say 610,00
Have Left Jobs in Country's Largest Walkout, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at Al. Moreover, the strikes
became violent. In many cities Korean police fired tear gas at violent protesters. In response, some
demonstrators hurled fragments of concrete and struck Korean police officers with metal pipes. What's
News World-Wide, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 3794559.
1 Sub & Nakarmi, supra note 3; Moody, supra note 2.
12 Unless otherwise specified, all dollar values in this Comment refer to U.S. currency.
13 Namju Cho, As Kim Lauds Law, Unions Threaten to Widen Strikes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,
1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 3794403.
14 See id. In Korean hospitals, a few union members would take turns covering emergency rooms
and caring for seriously ill patients. More then half of the workers at the government-run Korean
Broadcasting Company joined the strike. Id. Labor leaders estimated that over 1,800 Korean businesses
were affected by the nation wide protest strikes. Watanabe, supra note 10, at Al.
15 Namnju Cho, supra note 13; see also Korean Opposition Boosts Pressure On Government-Battle
Over Labor Law Intensifies, Sun-Sentinel Wire Services, Jan. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3083227.
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Furthermore, the nationwide protest strikes continued for a total of three
weeks and cost the Korean economy over three billion dollars in production
losses.
16
The protest strikes subsided in late January 1997, once Korean
President Kim Young Sam allowed opposition parties to revise the labor
reform law. The revisions to the labor reform law cut back on the rights
given to businesses by the New Korean Party during the pre-dawn
emergency session.17 The revisions restored job security by making it more
difficult for businesses to lay off employees and replace striking workers
with new hires. Moreover, the revisions legalized the Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions, which would not have been recognized for
another three years under the original law.19
Even so, labor unions and Korean workers remained dissatisfied with
the revised labor law.20 Businesses were also unhappy with the revised law.
Businesses expected the revised labor laws to increase industry
competitiveness by creating a more flexible labor market. 21  Labor unions
and workers were disappointed with the revised labor law because they
believed that the ambiguous wording of the law would still allow Korean
companies to dismiss workers too easily. 22  As a consequence, tensions
mounted between workers and business management over the regulation of
the workforce.
23
'6 S. Korea Strikes Cost $3.17B in Production, Export Losses, Dow Jones News Service, Jan. 15,
1997; Michael Schuman & In Kyung Kim, New Labor Law in South Korea Fails to Appease, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Mar. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 3798947.
I See generally Schuman & Kim, supra note 16.
18 Id.; see also Teresa Watanabe, S. Korea Revises Disputed Labor Law Asia: Bill Offers Expanded
Union Rights. Compromise Is Unlikely to Ease Anger that Triggered Widespread Strikes, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1997, at A9 [hereinafter S. Korea Revises Disputed Labor Law].
19 Schuman & Kim, supra note 16; see also S. Korea Revises Disputed Labor Law, supra note 18, at
A9.
20 S. Korea Revises Disputed Labor Law, supra note 18 at A9. Park Young Ki, an Industrial
Relations professor at Songang University called the new law "a flawed compromise that will not please
anyone." Id.
21 Schuman & Kim, supra note 16. Korean businessman Mr. Jeong Si Wha, a director at Ssanguong
Cement Industrial Co. stated, "the new law is worse than the original form of the bill, it only speaks for
labor." Id.
22 Id. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions believes that the vaguely worded law will allow
any business claiming financial difficulty to lay off workers and threatened to call more strikes in May. Id.
23 South Korean Workers Go on Strike for More Rights, AP Newswire, Dec. 23, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database [hereinafter South Korean Workers Go on Strike for More Rights]. As
recently as December of 1999, thousands of Korean workers held strikes and marched through central
Seoul demanding the government reduce the workweek from 44 to 40 hours per week with a change in
workers' pay and revise the labor laws to allow greater union activity. Id.; see also Christopher Torchia,
Once Defiant, South Korea's Labor Movement Recasts Image and Goals, Associated Press Newswires,
Dec. 13, 1999. The Federation of Korean Industries, South Korea's most powerful business lobby
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The covert passage of the new labor laws, the following protest
strikes, and the eventual repeal of the 1996 emergency labor law illustrate
the urgent, conflicting interests that threaten the viability of Korea's
industrialization strategy. This Comment argues that Korea must resolve
this conflict by increasing investment in the development of domestic
technological innovation. Part II examines Korea's industrialization and
history of poor labor standards and labor union suppression. Part III
explores Korea's democratization and the recent passage of new progressive
labor laws. Part IV explains why it is unlikely that the Korean government
will rescind the new progressive labor laws and concludes that a greater
investment in domestic technology could help to solve Korea's labor
problem.
II. KOREA'S INDUSTRIALIZATION: LoW-WAGE LABOR RESERVES AND
POOR LABOR STANDARDS
Korea, like many other East Asian countries, used an export-oriented
growth strategy in order to industrialize. 24 Export-oriented industrialization
is achieved through the production of cheap goods for export.25 Following
the Korean War, Korea promoted manufacturing exports in order to
transform the country from an agrarian based economy to an industrialized
economy.
26
Korea was successful in using an export-oriented growth strategy
because cheap labor was abundant at the beginning of Korea's
industrialization process. Initially, Korea had an "unlimited supply" of
large, low-wage labor reserves. 27  Three factors created these low-wage
labor reserves: high population growth rates, internal emigration patterns,
and government suppression of labor union organization.
representing over 400 major Korean companies, opposed the workers' demands. South Korean Labor
Leaders Keep Up Protests, AP Newswire, Dec. 6, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
24 Many other Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore also achieved
industrialization using an export-oriented growth strategy. See FREDRIC DEYO, BENEATH THE MIRACLE
LABOR SUBORDINATION IN THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 12-23 (1989).
25 See generally HANS LINNEMANN ET AL., EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 112 (1987); Alan S. Gutterman, Japan and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in Regulatory
Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 267, 283 (1991).
26 LINNEMANN ET AL., supra note 25, at 318, 323.
27 For a detailed discussion of Korea's large low-wage labor reserves see Alice Amsden, South
Korea's Record Wage Rates: Labor in Late Industrialization, 29 INDUS. REL. 77 (1990).
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A. Population Growth Rates and Internal Emigration Patterns
The growth of Korea's population after the Korean War was an
important factor in Korea's industrialization. In the 1960's, when Korea
began its industrialization process, it had an average population growth rate
of 2.5% per year.28  This is two and one-half times greater than the
population growth rate of industrialized countries in the 1960's.29 Internal
emigration patterns also contributed to Korea's high population. Fewer than
500,000 Koreans emigrated permanently between 1962 and 1982.30 In
contrast, more than forty million Europeans left Europe during its
industrialization process in the late 1800's. 31  As a consequence, Korea's
high population growth rate coupled with its low emigration rates created a
large population during the country's industrialization.
Korea's high population density and inequitable income distribution
ensured a large labor force.33  By 1960, one-fifth of the industrial and
agricultural work force in Korea was unemployed.34  This dramatic surplus
of labor contributed to lower wage levels in Korea.35 Moreover, masses of
out-of-work Korean laborers moved into the cities. 36  During Korea's
industrialization, more than one-third of the Korean population moved from
rural farms to cities. 37 By 1987, forty percent of all Korean citizens lived in
one of the country's four major cities, as compared to only ten percent in
1960.38 These unemployed laborers were grateful to have jobs regardless of
the pay and were fearful of speaking up against employers. 39  Korea's
28 Id. at 80. Korea's population growth rate decreased from 2.5% in 1965 to 0.9% in 1993. Korea's
Per-Capita GNP Was $6,330, KOREA ECON. DAILY, May 26, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus
Database. In population density, Korea was placed tenth in the world with 428 people per square
kilometer. Id.
29 See Amsden. supra note 27, at 80. Industrialized countries had an average annual population
growth rate of only 1.0%. Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See generally id. at 79-80.
33 Id. at 80.
34 Id. (citing W. D. REEVE, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY (1963)).
35 See generally id.
36 See Gutterman, supra note 25, at 279.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 279 n.48. By 1996, one quarter of Korea's 45-million inhabitants lived in the greater Seoul
area. Kang Yeoun, Rental System 'Desirable'for Young Housing Seekers, KOREA HERALD, May 5, 1996,
available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
39 Most of Korea's industrial work force was recruited from the countryside, where farmers were on
the margin of subsistence living, accustomed to hard work, and desperate to improve their family's
economic situation. Ezra Vogel & David Lindauer, Toward a Social Compact for South Korea in THE
STRAINS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: LABOR UNREST AND SOCIAL DISSATISFACTION IN KOREA 99 (1997); see
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compliant workforce created an attractive environment for the labor-
intensive manufacturing industries that began to develop as Korea
industrialized.
B. The Korean Government's Suppression of Labor Union Organization
Direct government suppression of labor union organization was the
most influential factor in creating cheap labor during Korea's
industrialization. Traditionally, countries that industrialize by importing
foreign technology, rather than through domestic technological innovation,
are extraordinarily hostile towards labor unions. 40  Korea, which has relied
on the importation of foreign technology, is no exception.41  The Korean
government used two major laws to control labor unions and keep wages
artificially low: 42 the Labor Union Act 43 and the Labor Dispute Mediation
Act."4
also Jennifer Porges, Comments the Development of Korean Labor Law and the Impact of the American
System, 12 COMP. LAB. L. 335, 348, 354 (1991).
4o Amsden, supra note 27, at 77.
41 In addition to suppressing labor unions in order to achieve low-wages and produce cheap goods
for export, the authoritarian government suppressed labor unions to maintain its grip on power. When
Korea began its industrialization process, the country was niled by General Park Chung Lee. Park's
government has been characterized as illegitimate because he did not gain power through an election.
Unions opposed Park and challenged the economic viability of his export-oriented industrialization
strategy. Consequently, Park suppressed labor unions because such public dissent threatened to his
authoritarian regime. WALDEN BELLO & STEPHANIE ROSENFELD, DRAGONS IN DISTRESS: ASIA'S MIRACLE
ECONOMIES IN CRISIS 47-50 (1990). When Park took power in 1961, the Korean government immediately
banned all strikes, deregistered existing unions, and arrested union activists. Fredric C. Deyo, State and
Labor: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 182, 185 (Fredric C. Deyo ed., 1987). Furthermore, the government
encouraged businesses to hire thugs to threaten and assault union organizers and kidnap union members in
order to brainwash them at "purification camps." GEORGE E. OGLE, SOUTH KOREA: DISSENT WITHIN THE
ECONOMIC MIRACLE 55-62 (1990).
42 The Korean government also passed the Labor Management Council Act, which required that
certain employers set up intraoffice consultation committees. These committees were to be consulted on
issues related to worker productivity, the prevention of labor disputes, and procedures for resolving
employee grievances. The committees undermined the collective bargaining process because employers
preferred to consult with these committees rather than bargain with labor unions. See Laura Watson, Labor
Relations and the Law in South Korea 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 229, 237-38 (1998).
43 Nodong chohappop [Labor Union Act] (adopted Dec. 7, 1963) [hereinafter Labor Union Act]
translated in LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1296 (Korean Legal Center, ed. 1964).
" Nondongchaengui chochongpop [Labor Dispute Mediation Act] (Apr. 17, 1963) [hereinafter
Labor Dispute Mediation Act] translated in LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 111-290 (Korean Legal
Center, ed. 1983).
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1. The Labor Union Act
The Labor Union Act, helped Korea's authoritarian government
maintAin complete control over labor unions. It prevented many unions
from organizing and required extensive supervision of recognized labor
unions. Thus, the Korean government was able to prohibit any union
activity that would put labor unions in a position to challenge Korea's
industrialization plan.4
The Labor Union Act placed labor unions under extensive
government supervision. To be recognized under the Labor Union Act,
Korean labor unions were required to file a comprehensive report to a
government administrative authority.47 The administrative authority then
had the power to recognize the union, to refuse to recognize the union, or to
delay recognition of the union until more information was filed.48 The
decision to recognize a union was political.49 Often, the administrative
authority would delay recognition of the union in order to give employers
the opportunity to break up the union before it was officially recognized or
to allow employers to quickly register a faux union instead.50
Once the union was recognized, government supervision continued.
The Korean government had an unlimited right to inspect union meeting
records,5' to change the union charter,52 and to audit union financial
records. 3 Labor union collective bargaining could not occur without state
approval,54 and the Korean government could force a union to change its
decisions or to render the decisions null and void." Moreover, the Labor
Union Act prohibited unions from participating in political action. Labor
unions could not conduct activities that would promote the election of a
particular political party or a specific political candidate.56 Labor unions
4s See infra notes 47-49.
4 See infra notes 56-58.47 Labor Union Act, supra note 43, art. 13(1).
49 See id. art. 15.
49 JANG JIP CHOI, LABOR AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE: LABOR UNIONS IN SOUTH KOREA
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1961-1980 103 (1989).
" OGLE, supra note 41, at 58. Employers who quickly registered a pro-business union were at a
great advantage because the Korean government would only recognize one union per company. Id.; see
also Watson, supra note 42, at 234.
51 Labor Union Act, supra note 43, art 30(1).
"2 Id. art 16.
53 Id. art. 25. A labor union's financial records were audited every six months, or more frequently at
the discretion of the government auditor. See id.
' See id. art 34(2).
s5 Id. art21.
' Id. art 12(1).
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could not collect political contributions from union members, and labor
union funds could not be used for political purposes. 7  The Korean
government used the Labor Union Act to insulate its regime by prohibiting
labor unions from engaging in political activity.
58
2. The Labor Dispute Mediation Act
The Labor Dispute Mediation Act, enacted in 1963, regulated labor
union strike activities, including general union activity and collective
bargaining agreements. Over time, Korean workers became extremely
militaristic.59 Korean unionists tried to engage in massive strikes and
demonstrations. However, the Labor Dispute Mediation Act allowed the
Korean government to control and intervene in these labor union activities.
The Labor Dispute Mediation Act made it difficult for labor unions to
hold legal strikes. Under this law, a strike could take place only after the
labor union notified the employer, the labor committee, and government
administrative authority.6° Moreover, the law required that labor unions
"cool off' for twenty to thirty days (depending upon the industry) before
instituting a strike. 6' During this cool-off period, employers were free to
take retaliatory measures to prevent the union strike from occurring. 62 All
strikes in the public sector, or against local government, public utilities, or
any business deemed important to the national economy were prohibited.63
Consequently, the Korean government was able to outlaw any labor strike
by defining which industries were important to the Korean national
economy.
The Korean government also played a central role in resolving
disputes between employers and labor unions. The Labor Dispute Mediation
Law required disputing parties to attempt conciliation during labor strikes.64
Unsuccessful conciliation permitted disputing parties to proceed to
mediation65 and binding arbitration. 66 These dispute resolution provisions
s7 Id. arts. 12(2) & (3).
58 See generally Porges, supra note 39, at 345.
59 Watson, supra note 42, at 235.
60 See Labor Dispute Mediation Act, supra note 44, arts. 5, 16.
61 Id. art. 14
6 See id. art. 17; see also Watson, supra note 42, at 235.
63 Labor Dispute Mediation Act, supra note 44, art. 40; see also Deyo, supra note 41, at 188.
6 Labor Dispute Mediation Act, supra note 44, arts. 18-21.
65 Id. arts. 20, 22. Traditionally, a mediation panel consisting of three people will issue a written
recommendation, which becomes binding if the parties agree to it. Id. arts. 23(3), 29.
6 Id. art. 30. Binding arbitration was often used when strikes affected a public utility or when both
parties requested binding arbitration in lieu of conciliation and mediation. Id.
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put labor unions at a great disadvantage, because the Korean government
colluded with businesses when it intervened during the strikes.67
Consequently, Korean unions perceived mandatory dispute resolution as a
government device to further suppress labor organization. 68
In summary, Korea used an export-oriented growth strategy to
successfully industrialize. Large labor reserves and the Korean
government's suppression of labor union organization contributed to
artificially low wage levels for Korean workers. 69 The Labor Union Act and
Labor Dispute Mediation Act made it difficult for labor unions to organize,
engage in political activity, and hold effective labor strikes. Together
Korea's large labor reserves and the government's suppression of labor
union organization precluded Korean workers from exerting economic
leverage on Korean businesses when negotiating for better working
conditions.
C. The Consequences of Korea's Industrialization
As a result of Korea's large labor reserves and government
suppression of labor union organization, Korean workers were subjected to
long working hours,70 poor work safety conditions,7' and low wages.72
Ultimately, Korean workers became distrustful of businesses and the
government.
During Korea's industrialization, Korean laborers had a long and
extremely dangerous workweek. In 1986, the year before Korea became a
democracy, Korea was the only country in the world to report a workweek of
more than fifty hours per week.73 The average Korean worked 54.7 hours per
week, while the workweek in other countries was significantly shorter.74
Korean work conditions were also dangerous. The number of industrial
fatalities and occupational injuries increased throughout Korea's
industrialization.75 For example, the number of worker fatalities rose from
67 Watson, supra note 42, at 236.
68 Id.
69 See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
70 Joung-Woo Lee & David Lindauer, The Quality of Working Life, in THE STRAINS OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH: LABOR UNREST AND SOCIAL DISSATISFACTION IN KOREA, supra note 39, at 80.
71 id.
72 Barry Wilkinson, The Korea Labour Problem, 32 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 342 (1994).
73 LEE & LINDAUER, supra note 70, at 80 (citing THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION,
YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS (1987)).
74 Id. For example, the average weekly hours worked that same year in Denmark was 33.0; the
United States: 40.7; Japan: 41.1; South Africa: 46.7; Mexico: 47.3 and Singapore: 48.5. Id.15 Id. at 83-86.
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845 in 1974 to an alarming 1761 in 1987.76 As Korea industrialized, the
Korean workforce was subjected to the longest work hours in some of the
most dangerous factories in the world."
The Labor Union Act and Labor Dispute Mediation Act ensured low
wages during Korea's industrialization by preventing strikes and labor union
organization. In 1975 the average wage of a Korean production worker in
manufacturing was $.33 per hour. Corresponding workers in other
countries earned considerably more. 79 By 1987, the average wage in Korea
had risen to $1.65 per hour, but was still significantly less than in other
countries.80
Cheap labor and efficient manufacturing were the cornerstones of
Korea's export-oriented industrialization. 81 Cheap labor was abundant when
Korea began its industrialization. Korea's large low-wage labor reserves
were perfectly compatible with the country's export-oriented growth strategy.
Furthermore, laws suppressing organized labor enhanced the legitimacy of
Korea's authoritarian government and allowed issues such as long working
hours, poor occupational safety, and low wages to go unaddressed.82 Korean
workers received most of the burden as the government faced pressure to
keep cheap labor in order to help businesses and the country stay competitive
in the global market.83
III. THE EFFECT OF KOREA'S DEMOCRATIZATION ON LABOR CONDITIONS
When Korea became a democracy in 1987, the government could no
longer suppress labor unions and still maintain a smooth industrialization
process. Unionists' concerns such as hazardous working conditions, long
workweeks, and low wages ignited a highly volatile labor movement.8
Massive strikes ensued, and the Korean government began changing its pro-
76 Id. (citing MINISTRY OF LABOR, YEARBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS and MINISTRY OF LABOR,
ANALYSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES.)
'7 Id. at 80-87.
78 Wilkinson, supra note 72, at 342.
79 Id. A worker in the same industry in the United States earned an hourly wage of $6.36, $3.05 in
Japan, $0.76 in Hong Kong and $0.84 in Singapore. Id.
so Id. Workers in the notoriously low wage countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan were
paid an hourly wage of $2.09, $2.31 and $2.26 respectively. Id.
SI See EZRA VOGEL, THE FOUR LITLE DRAGONS THE SPREAD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EAST ASIA
42 (1990); see also BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 167.
82 See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
3 Johanna Son, Asia Economy: Strikes in S. Korea Expose Flaws in Growth Formula, Inter Press
Service, Jan. 17, 1997, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
4 See Porges, supra note 39, at 354.
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business labor laws.8 5  Through Korea's democratization, labor unions
became successful in addressing the grievances of workers. 86 Throughout
the late 1980s and early 1990s the Korean government passed progressive
new labor laws that improved the compensation and working conditions of
the Korean workforce.87 New legislation also removed obstacles that made
it difficult to establish labor unions and gave existing. Korean labor unions
more autonomy.88 As a consequence, the bargaining capabilities of labor
unions increased and they were better able to address the concerns of Korean
workers.
A. Korea's Progressive New Labor Laws
In June 1987, the Korean government announced that it would hold
free elections and become a democracy.89 As a result, there was an
explosion of labor strikes and worker activism. 90 Many labor groups
protested the government's repressive labor laws and the growing dissent
culminated in highly politicized strikes and demonstrations by workers. 91
Prior to 1987, Korea averaged only 174 strikes per year, due largely to the
repressive Labor Union Act and Labor Dispute Mediation Act.92 In contrast,
during the summer of 1987 over 2500 strikes took place.9s These strikes
forced the government to make changes to improve conditions for Korean
workers.94
Much of the world watched the Korean government's reaction to the
1988 labor strikes, which directly preceded the Olympic Games in Seoul.95
Korea's political stability and reputation as an industrialized country were in
jeopardy.96 In order to end the strikes and unite the country, Korea's new
democratic government made major concession and began passing
5 Id. at 354-58.
" Id.; see also infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
:7 See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
8 Id.
89 Michael R. Curran, On Common Ground: Using Cultural Bias Factors to Deconstruct Asia-
Pacific Labor Law, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 348, 388 n. 161 (1997).
90 Id. at 388.
91 Porges, supra note 39, at 354.
92 Curran, supra note 89, at 388.
93 Id. More than 4300 strikes occurred in Korea between 1987 and 1993. Id. Manufacturing strikes
accounted for more than half of the strikes during this period. Id. It is estimated that Korean workers
initiated more labor strikes during the two months of July and August of 1987, than in the previous quarter
of a century. Vogel & Lindauer, supra note 39 at 93.
" Porges, supra note 39, at 354.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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progressive labor laws. The new legislation promoted a far more democratic
and unionized labor movement. The new labor laws provided for tougher
industrial safety regulations, more labor union autonomy, higher wages,
better leave policies, and increased job security. These new labor standards
illustrated the democratic government's commitment to the Korean
workforce.
1. Industrial Safety Regulations
In 1991, the Korean govemment launched a six-year plan to improve
occupational safety through the Industrial Safety Health Act. Under this
plan, workers became legally entitled to information about the hazardous
materials they were using, and the government was given greater control to
regulate the use of dangerous materials.97 The plan enabled the Korean
government to withhold approval of hazardous equipment and chemicals
98
and required that companies adopt specific worker safety measures. 99 The
plan required most Korean companies to establish and operate a special
safety and health committee, which was composed of an equal number of
management and labor representatives.'1 The committee addressed the
industrial safety concerns of company workers. 1 1 The plan also mandated
that many Korean business owners staff an industrial health doctor at the
workplace'0 2 and conduct an education program on work safety and health
for all company workers. 0 3
2. Increased Access to Labor Unions
Establishing labor unions became easier under Korea's new
democratic government. Amendments to the Labor Union Act made in 1987
removed many government restrictions on union formation. The waiting
period to establish a union was shortened,' °4 and the amount of paperwork
97 Mark Clifford, Counting the Costs, 21 FAR E. ECON. REV. 64 (Nov. 1991); see also Industrial
Safety and Health Act (adopted Jan. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Industrial Safety and Health Act], art. 40,
translated in CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3587 (Korea Legislation Research Institute ed.,
1998).
98 Industrial Safety and Health Act, supra note 97, art. 34.99 Id. art. 23.
'0o Id. art. 19.
101 Id.
'0o Id. art. 17.
103 Id.
104 Porges, supra note 39, at 355.
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required was reduced.10 5  Moreover, the requirement that a union have a
minimum number of members before it formed was eliminated.
1°6
Therefore, the amendments permitted a minority of workers to establish a
labor union. As the government removed many obstacles to labor union
formation, the rate of unionization in Korea increased dramatically. 1
07
3. Compensation and Employment Security
After 1987, the Korean govemment also passed liberal legislation
increasing worker compensation, paid leave, and job security.
Consequently, Korea's minimum wage rose while the workweek became
shorter. Employers were forced to implement progressive paid leave
policies and education assistance programs. The new laws also increased
job security by limiting an employer's ability to dismiss workers for
administrative reasons.
The Minimum Wage Act is a comprehensive set of rules regulating
wages in Korea. The purpose of the Minimum Wage Act is to "stabilize
workers' lives and to improve the quality of the labor force by guaranteeing
them a certain minimum level of wages."'08  The Minimum Wage Act
requires the Korean Ministry of Labor to establish a Minimum Wage
Council. °9 The Minimum Wage Council researches, deliberates, and
submits a minimum wage proposal to the Korean Ministry of Labor every
year." 0 The new legislation requires that Korea's minimum wage be
determined according to this minimum wage proposal."' Consequently,
Korea's minimum wage is determined on an annual basis, thereby allowing
for yearly wage increases." 
2
In the early 1990's the Korean workweek was shortened significantly.
New legislation restricted Korean laborers from working more than 44 hours
105 Id.
10 Porges, supra note 38 at 355 n.115 (citing KOREA'S EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN KOREA, 1980-1987 31 (1987)).
107 Porges, supra note 38, at 355 n.116 (citing A. Rauenhorst, Industrial Relations in Korea: The
Backdrop to the Current Drama 6 (Jan. 30, 1989) (unpublished manuscript)). In 1981 there were 2,141
trade unions. By 1989, just two years after the Labor Union Act amendments, there were over 7,800 trade
unions in Korea. Id.
108 Minimum Wage Act (adopted Dec. 31, 1986) [hereinafter Minimum Wage Act], art. 1, translated
in CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3586 (Korea Legislation Research Institute ed., 1998).
I9 Id. art. 12. The council is composed of nine members, representing workers, employers, and the
public interest. Id. art. 14.
110 Id. art 8.
111 Id.
112 The minimum wage must be determined by the fifth of August every year. Id.
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per week.1 3 Exceptions to this statutory working hour requirement were not
permitted. After Korea's democratization, the government prohibited
flexible working-hour systems (working forty hours one week and forty-
eight hours the next week), even when both laborers and employers
preferred such flexible systems.' 14 The forty-four-hour workweek required a
Korean employer to pay workers an extra fifty percent for every hour they
worked above forty-four hours a week. 115  Women and minors could not
work between the hours of "10 P.M. and 6 A.M." unless they specifically
consented to working the shift and the Korean Ministry of Labor
approved."l 6 Moreover, any male employee who worked between the hours
of 10 P.M. and 6 A.M. was paid a night premium of fifty percent of his
normal hourly wage in addition to any regular wages or overtime pay."
7
The new laws forced Korean employers to provide paid leave and
educational opportunities for company employees. For instance, under the
new laws, all female employees in Korea enjoy a one-day paid menstruation
leave per month."m8 Mothers nursing infants under the age of one were given
two thirty-minute periods of paid leave every day.119 All employees earned
one day of paid leave per month that could be accumulated up to one year.
120
In addition to the paid monthly leave, employees with good attendance
records earned an extra eight-day or ten-day paid annual leave.' 21  If a
person employed more than thirty people under eighteen years of age, they
had to establish an educational facility for them, or, with the approval of the
Ministry of Labor, award scholarships to each employee under eighteen
"3 See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
114 Jeong-Ho Cho, How the Korean Government Has Proceeded with Core Labor Issues (visited Jan.
26, 2000) <http://www.koilaf.org/koilaf new/comt002.html>. This was the law in Korea for many years
until 1997, when the Korean government allowed employers to implement a flexible working hour system
on a fortnightly and monthly basis. However, during the late 1980's and early 1990's, such flexible
working shifts were not available to Korean workers. Id.
116 Labor Standards Act (adopted Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Labor Standards Act], art. 68,
translated in CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3539 (Korea Legislation Research Institute ed.,
1998).
11 Sandra R McCandless et al., Employing Workers Abroad: A Guide to Legal Requirements of
Employment Relationships in Selected Nations, 23 FALL BRIEF 30, 36 (1993).
1'sLabor Standards Act, supra note 116, art. 71.
"9 Id. art. 73.
'20 Id. art. 57.
121 Id. art. 59. A worker will receive an additional ten-day annual paid leave if the worker has not
been absent during the course of a full year of work. Eight days of annual paid leave is awarded to workers
who have a ninety percent rate of attendance during one year. An additional day of annual paid leave is
granted for every consecutive year of employment after the worker has completed the first two years of
employment. Id. Therefore, a worker can take up to twenty days of annual paid leave per year and an
employer can substitute ordinary paid wages for the number of days in excess of twenty days, instead of
granting additional paid leave. Id.
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years old. 122  Moreover, an employer was required to pay for all travel
expenses when an employee under eighteen years of age returned home after
their dismissal from work.
123
Along similar lines, new laws also made it difficult for Korean
employers to dismiss workers. In order to dismiss or transfer any worker,
Korean employers had to prove that the business is in a state of
emergency.' 14 The laws also required that employers make every effort to
avoid the dismissal of an employee. 125 All employers must consult any
organized labor unions regarding methods for avoiding dismissal and the
criteria for the dismissal of employees. Thirty days advance notice must be
given to dismissed employees. 126 If proper advance notice is not given, the
employer must pay ordinary wages for the remainder of the thirty days.
127
The laws also mandated that if employers wish to hire new workers within
two years of a company dismissal, the company must first make every effort
to preferentially re-employ any dismissed worker.
128
B. The Impact of Pro-Labor Laws on the Korean Worker
Compared to Korea's history of poor working conditions, low wages,
and labor union suppression, the new labor laws were a major advancement
for Korean workers. The workweek was shortened and progressive paid-
leave policies were implemented. Korean workers could more easily form
unions and they had better job security. However, the high-wage growth
rate probably had the biggest effect on Korean workers, as their salaries now
rivaled and even surpassed those in advanced industrialized countries.
The Korean government's six-year plan to increase occupational
safety was successful. After the democratic government enacted the
Industrial Safety and Health Act, the number of worker accidents began to
decrease. The number of reported accidents in the Korean manufacturing
industry decreased from 59,180 in 1991 to 39, 292 in 1994.129 Furthermore,
those workers who were injured found it easier to claim compensation from
12 Id. art. 75; but see Act No. 5885 (adopted Feb. 8, 1999) (deleting Article 75 of the Labor
Standards Act, supra note 116).
123 Id. art. 74; but see Act No. 5885 (adopted Feb. 8, 1999) (deleting Article 75 of the Labor
Standards Act, supra note 116).
124 Labor Standards Act, supra note 116, art. 31.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. art. 32.
"s Id. art. 31-2.
129 Byung Yong Jeong, Characteristics of Occupational Accidents in the Manufacturing Industry of
South Korea. 20 INDUS. ERGONOMICS 302 (1997).
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their employers. 130 The plan made great strides to improve the dangerous
working conditions in Korea.
Korean workers also enjoyed improvement in the length of their
workweek. Korean workers were provided with paid vacations and the new
laws required employers to implement accommodating paid leave policies
for pregnant employees and women with young children. In fact, the length
of the average Korean workweek decreased nine and one-half hours per
week in just five years.' 31 Nonetheless, Korean laborers continued to fight
for further reductions in the workweek. Korean workers struck as recently
as December of 1999, demanding that the Korean workweek be cut from
forty-four hours per week to forty hours per week. 132
The Minimum Wage Act and the amendments to the Labor Union Act
led to dramatic increases in Korean wages. The Minimum Wage Act
allowed the Korean minimum wage to be increased on a yearly basis. The
amendments to the Labor Union Act made it easier for labor unions to form,
thus providing workers with more leverage when bargaining with
employers. Between 1986 and 1990, the average wage of manufacturing
production workers more than doubled in Korea, reaching $3.82 per hour.133
Furthermore, the average Korean wage continued to increase by nine percent
in 1992 and by an additional fifteen percent in 1993.34 By 1996, the
average wage of a Korean consumer electronic factory worker had more
than doubled since 1992. In fact, Korean wages had risen so dramatically
that even the manufacturing wages of workers advanced industrialized
countries manufacturing wages were thirty percent lower than the wages of
their Korean counterparts.' For example, in 1996 the average British
consumer electronic factory worker made $6.94 per hour, while the same
Korean worker earned $9.99 per hour. 136
130 Clifford, supra note 97, at 65.
'31 The average Korean workweek was 54.7 hours in 1986. Lee & Lindaur, supra note 70. By 1991,
the average workweek in Korea had decreased to 45.2 hours. Wilkinson, supra note 72, at 343.132 South Korean Workers Go on Strike for More Rights, supra note 23.
133 Wilkinson, supra note 72, at 342.
34 Steven V. Brull & Catherine Keumhyun Lee, Why Seoul is Seething: Koreans Want the
Mismanaged Chaebol to Share the Economic Pain, Bus. WK, Jan. 27, 1997, available in WESTLAW,
Busweek Database.
133 Id.
136 Id.
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C. The Impact of Pro-Labor Laws on Korean Businesses
The new laws, supported by Korean workers, became a major obstacle
to the global market competitiveness of Korean firms.1 37  The reduced
workweek and progressive paid leave policies meant that the level of
productivity per Korean worker decreased. Moreover, the higher wage
levels and the restrictions on employee dismissals substantially reduced
business profits. To counteract the costs of employment, Korean businesses
attempted to raise product prices. These attempts proved unsuccessful and
many businesses began to face bankruptcy.
1. Lower Productivity
Korean businesses experienced decreased profits because of marginal
labor productivity rates. Productivity is the amount of product created by
one unit of a given factor of production over a specific period of time.
Labor cost is a factor of production. Under the new laws, Korean laborers
have a shorter workweek and are entitled to monthly and annual paid
vacations. Consequently, the total amount of hours worked by Korean
laborers is reduced, and the productivity rate per worker is decreased. 38 In
addition, economic studies found that the increasing rate of unionization in
Korea negatively affected to labor productivity.1
39
Furthermore, because Korea had a nearly unlimited supply of cheap
labor, many Korean businesses failed to upgrade worker skills and invest in
labor-saving technology that would increase labor productivity per
worker. 14° Instead, to bolster labor productivity, Korean business often
required laborers to simply work faster. For example, after the enactment of
the new laws, Kia Motors required its car painters to complete paint jobs in
just two minutes and ten seconds, whereas the painters were previously
"'1 C.W. Lim, South Korean Business Groups Rush for Massive Layoffs, Agence France-Presse, Sept.
9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database. Generally, South Korea's major business groups
are laying off staff to reduce production costs, and blaming high wages for eroding their competitive edge
abroad. Id. See also Erik Miller, Structural Impediments to South Korea's Economic Growth (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
138 Although South Korea's overall labor productivity increased during the 1980's and 1990's, in
terms of value added per person, South Korea was still far behind other advanced countries. Korea Enjoys
the Highest Labor Productivity Growth Since 1980, KOREA ECON. DAILY, Sept. 10, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database. In 1996, Korea reported $28,166 in value added per person compared
with $49,150 in value added per person registered in the United States. Id.
139 Michael Byungnam Lee & Yinsog Rhee, Bonuses, Unions, and Labor Productivity in South Korea
XVII, 2 JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH 219, 219-38 (1996).
140 Chang Do Young, a painter at Kia Motors, stated "workers have been sacrificed while business
has neglected to invest in new technology." Watanabe, supra note 10, at Al.
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given four minutes and thirty seconds. 141 In the past, Korea never had an
exceptionally high rate of labor productivity but was always able to compete
in the international market because of low labor wages. 142 This became
difficult as labor wages rose under the new labor laws.
2. Decreased Profits
Despite increased sales, the dramatic wage growth rate contributed to
decreased profits for Korean businesses. In 1989, earnings for South Korean
companies fell by 0.2% from the previous year even though Korean
companies experienced a sharp rise of 13% in sales.' 43  Korean business
earnings were down because of high wages and the strong value of the
Korean won.144 South Korea's major business groups blamed high wages
for eroding their competitive edge abroad. 45  Korean carmakers reported
increased sales revenues but a decrease in company profits. Hyundai's sales
increased 21% but profits decreased 20%. 146 Similarly, Kia increased sales
by 7.9% but profits decreased 69%. 147  Daewoo also experienced sales
increases and company profit losses. 48  All three companies cited labor
disputes as the major factor for the decrease in company profits. 49
Consequently, by 1998, Hyundai Motor Company announced that it would
be forced to cut its 300,000-person work force by 20%.150 In the 1990's,
Korean firms began losing profits, placing the blame on workers, labor
unions and the new labor laws themselves.
141 Id.
142 Id. The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions admits that Korean business competitiveness
increased 11% annually during the same period that Korean wages decreased by 8.3%. Hannah Miller,
Asian Pacific Coalition brings S. Korean strike into UCLA area (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://www-
paradigm.asucla.ucla.edu/DB/issues/97/02.18/news.korea.html>. See also Adam Szirmai & Dirk Pilat,
Comparisons of Purchasing Power, Real Output, and Labour Productivity in Manufacturing in Japan,
South Korea, and the U.S.A. 1975-85, 36 REVIEW OF INCOME AND WEALTH (1990).
143 South Korean Concerns' Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1990, available in WESTLAW,
Allnewsplus Database.
144Id.
143 Lim, supra note 137.
46 Profits for Car Makers in South Korea Fell in 1991, on Labor Woes, WALL ST. J., Mar.2, 1992,
available in 1992 WL-WSJ 663517.
147 Id.
148 Id. Daewoo sales increased 3.9% but the company also reported a 100 billion won decrease in
profits. Id. Korean businesses and the media nicknamed this phenomenon "profitless prosperity." Id.
149 Id.
15o Hyundai Plans Massive Layoffs, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1998, at B9. Unions immediately
responded to Hyundai's lay-off announcement by vowing not to accept the management's decision and
threatening to call a general labor strike. Hyundai Motor to Lay Off More than 4,800 Workers, ASIA
PULSE, June 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12620261.
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3. Korean Business Reacts
As a result of the new labor laws, Korean business found it difficult to
pay off debts and remain competitive in the global market. Korean
manufacturing wages increased by 100% between 1986 and 1990, while
productivity increased by less than 20%.151 Consequently, the unit cost of
labor, meaning the cost of labor for the production of one unit of output,
increased by 67%.152 Given this reality, many Korean companies were faced
with the possibility of going bankrupt.
The Daewoo Group is one such example. The Daewoo group was
founded in 1967 by Kim Woo-Choong and grew to be Korea's fourth largest
chaebol, 153 manufacturing cars, ships, and consumer electronics.' 54 In 1989
the shipbuilding group had accumulated a $1.95 billion debt that threatened
to bankrupt the entire chaebol. 155 At the same time, unions representing the
shipyard's 12,000 employees went on strike demanding a 55% pay
increase. 156 In the eleventh hour, the Korean government bailed out the
chaebol, fearing that Daewoo's collapse would undermine the entire Korean
economy.157 In response, Daewoo founder Kim Woo Choong immediately
published the best selling book, It's a Big World and There's a Lot To Be
Done, demanding that Korean workers put aside self-interests in favor of
national greatness.15
8
In an effort to avoid Daewoo's situation, many Korean companies
attempted to raise the prices of their products. Higher wages coupled with
low productivity forced Korean businesses to adopt a strategy of higher
pricing. However, this strategy was unsuccessful because the demand for
Korean goods decreased as the prices rose. 159 In fact, one economic study
1 Wilkinson, supra note 72, at 344. Furthermore, Korea's labor costs continued to spiral out of
control. Brull & Lee, supra note 134. Through 1990's, the average real wages rose an additional 8.2% per
year, far outstripping the average productivity gains of only 6.5% per year. Id.
152 Id.
153 Chaebols are conglomerates of many companies clustered around one holding company and are
usually controlled by one family. For a detailed explanation of Korean chaebols see Yes But What Exactly
Is a Chaebol?, (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.megastories.com/seasia/skorea/chaebol/chaewhat.
htm>.
1:4 Peter Koenig, Birth Pangs of a Securities Giant, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1, 1990, at 24.
'" Id.
56 id.
137 Id.
15s Id. In response to Kim Woo Choong's book, Park Noe-Hae, a Korean fugitive, published Our
Love and Our Wrath, demanding that Korea's leaders ensure the country's greatness through a fair division
of wealth. Id.
159 For example, in the competitive athletic shoe industry, the price of athletic shoes increased 10 to
20% in 1988 because of a decrease in production of shoes in South Korea. These higher prices lead to
sticker shock, causing consumers around the world to buy even fewer pairs of athletic shoes. Melissa
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concluded that the Korean wage hike caused Korean products to be more
expensive than complementary U.S. and Japanese products. 16°  The
declining demand for Korean products on the global market caused the level
of Korean exports to fall.
16 1
The circumstances surrounding the covert passage of the new labor
laws in 1997 illustrated the growing tension between Korean workers and
businesses over Korean work standards. Korean workers, who once had
some of the longest workweeks and most dangerous work environments in
the world, are enjoying the benefits of their new democratic government's
progressive labor laws. Korean workers now enjoy the same rights and
protections that have long existed in other industrialized countries.
162
Conversely, Korean businesses who helped transform the country from an
agrarian society to an industrialized economy are finding it difficult to avoid
bankruptcy under the regulated Korean workweek.
A compromise between Korean businesses and workers needs to be
reached in order for Korea to increase its global competitiveness while
ensuring that the current labor standards remain intact. The problem facing
Korea is how to make an economy competitive in the wake of the recent
enactment of progressive labor laws and worker rights when the principal
success of that economy has been rooted in cheap labor. Indeed, both pro-
worker and pro-business interests in the regulation of the Korean workweek
are legitimate. As such, any solution must reach the goal of making Korean
businesses competitive in the global market without sacrificing the new
rights and freedoms given to Korean workers.
IV. A SOLUTION TO KOREA'S LABOR PROBLEM
It is unlikely that the Korean government will repeal the newly
enacted progressive labor laws. Although .repeal would allow Korean
businesses to increase productivity levels through the regulation of their own
workweeks, the repeal of the new labor laws would likely elicit retaliatory
reaction from Korean laborers, foreign countries, and international
organizations. A more feasible approach to solving Korea's labor problems
lies in domestic technological innovation. Currently, Korean businesses
Turner, Sneaker Makers Run To Keep Up Nike, Reebok Locked In Battle for Market's $3.1 Billion in Sales,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 20, 1988 at C01.
160 Joono Cho et al., The Effects of the Korean Wage Hikes on Korean Trade Structure With the U.S.
and Jaan,.61 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 458, 506 (1994).
162 See generally McCandless et al., supra note 117 (description of the employment laws in other
countries, including the European Economic Community, Japan and China).
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must import most of the technology they use in the goods that they export.
Importing technology is expensive and requires that Korean businesses pay
high royalty fees and enter into expensive direct licensing agreements.
However, if Korea could develop technology through domestic
technological innovation, Korean businesses could still be profitable even
with the lower worker productivity levels that have resulted from the
regulation of the Korean workweek.
A. Rescinding the New Labor Laws: An Unlikely Alternative
In light of Korea's democratization and the consequent reform of
Korea's labor laws, repeal is not a feasible alternative for two reasons. First,
Korean workers are so militant that they would not allow the government to
repeal the current labor laws. For example, Korean laborers engaged in
massive protests and crippling labor strikes when the Korean government
tried to scale back the scope of the progressive labor laws in 1997.163 A
complete repeal of the labor laws would likely elicit an even greater
retaliatory reaction from Korean workers and labor unions. 164 Although
labor unions understand that chaebol bankruptcy means there will be fewer
jobs for Korean workers, they still continue to hold labor strikes to improve
their labor conditions.'
65
Secondly, intemational organizations and other countries would likely
pressure Korea to retain the current progressive labor laws.' 66  On October
11, 1996 Korea joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
:63 See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
64 Korea's labor movement has often been characterized as militant. In recent years, Korean workers
have been willing to engage in massive, week-long strikes in order to preserve the country's new labor
laws. For example, Korean unions still continued to threaten employers and call for additional labor strikes
months after the 1997 pre-dawn labor union laws were rescinded by the Korean government. Schuman &
Kim, supra note 16.
63 Kim Ho Jin, chairman of the Tripartite Commission, which handles Korea's labor disputes,
analogizes: "When a ship is sinking, there are no fights on board. The union understands that as the
Daewoo ship is sinking, unless management and labor cooperate, everyone will be wiped out." Korea's
Labor Unions To Be Cooperative in Daewoo Revamp, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1999, at 4.
Nevertheless, Korean unions continue to hold strikes, demanding that their workweek be shortened further.
South Korean Workers go on Strike for more Rights, supra note 23.
166 Korea's past abusive labor laws have been criticized by such organizations as the International
Labor Organization, the United Nation's Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Human
Rights Watch/Asia, in addition to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. Richard
Dicker, South Korea Labor Rights Violations under Democratic Rule, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 196, 197
(1996). The World Trade Organization supports the International Labor Organization's work in promoting
certain core labor standards. Steve Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD
Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
131, 155 (1997).
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Development ("OECD") Council. 16 7  The OECD Council is comprised of
countries committed to economic development and respect for human
rights.168 In the past, the OECD was a major critic of Korea's labor laws and
only allowed Korea to join the OECD Council after the democratic
government revised Korea's previous labor laws. 169  The OECD also
expressed widespread concern about the revisions that were passed during
Korea's secret pre-dawn assembly on December 26, 1997.170 If Korea were
to return to its previous abusive labor laws, organizations such as the OECD
would press the Korean government to revise the labor laws until
international labor standards and basic human rights were restored.
B. Domestic Technological Innovation
Since repealing the new labor laws is an unlikely alternative, South
Korea should increase domestic technological innovation. By producing
technology domestically through direct foreign investment, Korean
businesses can earn higher profits without compromising the new labor
rights given to Korean workers.'
7
'
167 Dicker, supra note 166, at 241. See also S. Korea Labor Laws (visited Jan. 5, 2000)
<http://kimsoft.com/korea/sk-lab2.htm>
168 Convention of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960,
preamble, 12 U.S.T. 1728. Additional OECD countries include: Australia, Japan, Germany, Mexico, New
Zealand, Turkey, and the United States. OECD, About OECD, (visited June 24, 2000)
<http://www.oecd.org/about>.
169 OECD Official Calls for Labor Reforms by This Year, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 17, 1996, available in
1996 WL 13443821.
170 Korean Labour Law Tops OECD Council Agenda, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 23, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 2046060. Moreover, international trade unions such as the Intemational
Confederation of Free Trade Unions expressed support for striking Korean workers and denounced the pre-
dawn labor laws that led to the labor strikes. International Trade Union Group Denounces South Korea's
New Labor Laws, WEST LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WLN 14245.
171 Technology development through foreign investment would also help Korea recover from its
recent economic crisis. Korea's economic crisis was brought about by reckless chaebol investment
decisions and a series of conglomerate bankruptcies. [Reviewing President Kim 's Two Years] Building a
New Economy, KOREA TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, available in 2000 WL 8239531. However, domestic
technological innovation through foreign investment appears to be one way Korea can overcome its recent
economic crisis. Robert J. Fouser, Cultural Dimensions; Whatever Happened to Productivity Issues,
KOREAN HERALD, July 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12274295. Currently, the Korean government is
trying to break down the barriers to foreigners who wish to work, invest, and live in Korea. Restrictions
regarding foreign land ownership and foreign investment have been lifted. A 10,000 square meter
residential complex was recently built in downtown Seoul, exclusively for foreign investors, a new
convention center is in the process of being built, and many taxi drivers are being trained to speak basic
English and their cabs will be marked with special stickers so that foreign businesspeople can easily
recognize them. Kim Chong-Tae, Doing Business in Seoul is Getting Easier, BUS. KOREA, Feb. 1, 1999, at
46.
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1. The Importance of Technology Transfer
Wealthy countries tend to have advanced technology while less-
developed countries must import their technology. The pre-existing wealth
of developed countries lays the groundwork for major technological
development, which in turn makes future technological innovation
possible.1 72  A lack of technological innovation is a barrier to the global
market competitiveness of less-developed countries. 173  Less-developed
countries have fewer resources to devote to research and development,
education, and infrastructure.' 74 Because less developed countries cannot
match the technological developments of most developed countries, they are
excluded from competing in profitable markets. 75  Consequently, less-
developed countries must import technology ("technology transfer") in order
to compete in the global market. 176 Korea is one such example.' 7
Technology transfer allows less-developed countries to have access to
technology that could not be produced through domestic research and
development. 178 Korea is one example of a country that has made use of
technology transfer in its modem development. 79  Generally, technology
transfer occurs in the late stages of a product cycle when it becomes
profitable for firms in developed countries to produce goods through
172 Three factors are essential to the social and economic success of a country: education,
technological innovation, and access to information. Samuel Zaitlin, The Laptop and the Pine Tree in
Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4260842. Factors that lead to
technology development include efficient infrastructure and a supply of high-quality human capital. This
requires that countries invest heavily in savings, advanced education, research and development, and proper
physical infrastructure. David C. O'Conner, Technology and Industrial Development in the Asian NIEs:
Past Performance and Future Prospects, in THE EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY OF THE PACIFIC
RIM 55, 57-59 (Denis Fred Simon ed., 1995).
173 This is true for developing countries such as South Africa. Consequently, Professor Peter van
Eldik of Technikon Pretoria called for the South African government to support higher education
institutions in their role of technological innovation. He also stated that higher education institutions
needed to revise their strategies in order to exploit the opportunities and challenges they faced in
technological innovation. Technikons Still Have Important Role in Education, Seminar Hears, SouTH
AFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIAION, Oct. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 28032374.
174 For example, Korea's school enrollment rates were very low during its industrialization. In 1965
Korea's secondary enrollment rate was 35%, while the tertiary rate was 6%. O'Connor, supra note 172 at
59.
175 Less developed countries are forced in the low end of the market, with small profits from selling
less sophisticated goods. See infra notes 205-210 and accompanying text.
6 Fumio Kodamna, Emerging Trajectory of the Pacific Rim: Concepts, Evidences, and New Schemes,
in THE EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY OF THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 172, at 28-42.
177 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 17-21.
78 Kodama, supra note 176, at 30.
'79 VOGEL, supra note 81, at 58-60.
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subsidiaries in cheaper labor markets.18 0  Through technology transfer,
Korea is able to compete with the most highly developed countries in the
manufacture and sale of profitable high-technology goods such as cars and
consumer electronics. 181
2. Korea's Failure to Develop New Technology
During the 1970s and 1980s, when countries such as the United
States, Japan, and West Germany were developing new technology,
182
Korea failed to do so for three reasons. First, the Korean government did
not allocate sufficient resources for research and development of new
technology. Second, Korean businesses often channeled profits into
speculative cash-generating investments instead of reinvesting profits into
new product innovation. Lastly, Korea lacked the necessary infrastructure
of technical personnel to develop cutting-edge technology.'
8 3
The Korean government did not devote the same resources to
domestic technology innovation as other, more developed, nations did. For
example, in 1989 the Korean government spent approximately $3.89 billion
dollars on technological research and development.' 84 This was roughly the
same amount that a large U.S. corporation such as IBM or General Motors
spent in that same year.'85 Moreover, the proportion of Korea's investment
in research and development by the Korean government and by the public
sector has decreased from 70.3% in 1970 to 17.1% in 1989. 86 In fact, S.I.
Chun, the Washington representative of the Electronics Industry Association
of Korea, readily admits, "[w]e are still far behind in both high technology
and capital."' 8 7 In other more successful export-oriented Asian countries, a
Is0 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 150. However, it is most profitable for a firm to enter a
fast-growing technology driven market early as it will determine the firm's export performance as well as
market share. Id.
181 VOGEL, supra note 81, at 58-60.
182 For example, the development of open-ended spinning and shutteless weaving systems greatly
reduced the labor intensity of textile production and boosted the productivity of United States, Japanese,
and European textile manufacturing companies, countering the low-wage advantage of manufacturers in
Korea. BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 124. The development of an innovative computerized-cloth
cutting system and new rotor sewing spindles, which offered a 40% saving in manpower over traditional
ring spindles, allowed textile firms such as Germany's Hugo Boss to successfully offset labor costs through
an efficient, technologically automated garment production process. Id. at 124-25.
183 For an in-depth discussion on South Korea's failure to develop technology, see id. at 129-64.
18 Seongjae Yu, Korea's High-Technology Trust in THE EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY
OF THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 176, at 81, 91.
1is Id.
196 id.
18' Michael Schrage, S. Koreans Push To Gain High-Technology Foothold, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
1986, available in 1986 WL 4764960.
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comparable decrease in the governments' investment in research and
development did not occur.' 88 This suggests that the burden of research and
development was shifted to the private sector too early in Korea.189
Similarly, huge chaebols in the Korean private sector failed to invest
in research and development, to modernize manufacturing plants, to develop
new equipment, and to produce better technology. Instead of funneling
money into research and development, chaebols engaged in high-profit,
speculative investments such as investments in land, luxury hotels, and golf
courses. 190 With property prices skyrocketing several hundred percent in the
late 1980s, chaebols made substantial profits from such investments.19'
Most chaebols would re-invest these profits back into fast, cash-generating,
speculative investments, rather than into development of new product
technology. 192  In response, one angry trade journalist stated, "while
complaining about nonavailability of money for their product investment,
chaebols spend huge sums on land and securities which are not urgently
needed."'19 Recently, the Korean government enacted a three-year plan to
force Korea's five largest chaebols to concentrate on core businesses and
dispose of other unprofitable ones.' 94 Despite this plan, Korean firms
continue to make speculative investments. 195
Moreover, even if the Korean government and chaebols had been
willing to spend more money on developing self-sustaining technology,
domestic technological innovation would still have been limited by Korea's
lack of technical personnel. 196  In 1990, while the United States had 160
25' Yu, supra note 184, at 91. The Japanese government's investments in domestic research and
development only decreased by 8.1% between 1970 and 1989. Id.1 9 Id.
190 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 115. It is estimated chaebols invested $16.5 billion in
land, hotels and resorts instead of research and development. Id.
:91 Maggie Ford, Seoul in a Twist Over Top 30, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1989, at I.
92 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 71.
193 The Chaebol Draw Fire, Bus. KOREA, June 1989, at 7.
194 In 1998, South Korea's Financial Supervisory Commission unveiled a three-stage plan to force
Korean chaebols to dispose of their unprofitable businesses in different industrial sectors, including
semiconductors, petrochemicals, oil refinery and rolling stock. The goal of the plan is to liquidate
chaebol's non-core businesses. This would coerce chaebols to dissolve their debt payment guarantees to
their affiliates and cut their overall debt ratios. Many chaebols such as Hyundai and the Federation of
Korean Industries, a chaebol lobbying group, were dissatisfied with the plan and worried that it would
threaten chaebol existence. Top Five Chaebol to Be Disintegrated, KOREA TIMES (visited Mar. 28, 2000)
<http://www.korealink.co.kr/14 3/98 10/t4351204.htm>.
195 For example, the Hyundai Group recently announced plans to invest approximately $1 billion to
build a resort in North Korea. The Hyundai Group sought approval of North Korea's reclusive Communistleaders to build the new resort, which will include a 45-hole golf course, ski slope, a 1,000 room seaside
hotel, domed theater, glass atrium and deepwater docks. Calvin Sims, North Korea As The Next Tourist
Spot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at C1.
196 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 4 1, at 115-16.
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engineers per 10,000 workers and Japan had 240 engineers per 10,000
workers, Korea only had thirty-four engineers per 10,000 workers. 19
Similarly, Intel Korea Manager Y.K. Sohn stated that in the late 1980's there
were only approximately 200 personal-computer architecture engineers in all
of Korea.19 There was not one scientist employed in the entire auto-parts
industry, and less than 9% of the work force in the auto-parts industry
consisted of skilled workers. 99 Furthermore, Korea is facing a significant
"brain drain," or loss of technical personnel, to the United States. Of the
7200 Korean scientists and engineers estimated to have studied in the United
States between 1968 and 1986, more than 6000 now permanently reside in
the U.S. 20  Consequently, Korea had neither the investment nor human
capital necessary to sustain domestic technological innovation.
3. Korea's Dependence on Japan for Technology
Because Korea did not develop new technology, it has been forced to
import expensive foreign technology from other industrialized countries.
Much of the technology for Korean goods is imported from Japan. Although
Japanese companies are reluctant to share their technology with other
nations, Korea has been persistent and successful in importing this
technology from Japan at extremely high prices.
The Korean automobile, consumer electronic, and computer industries
are all dependent upon Japanese technology. Japanese high technology parts
and components account for 20 to 30% of the value of Korean automobiles,
35 to 45% of the value of Korean machine tools, 60% of the value of Korean
computers, 65% of the value of Korean printers, and 85% of the value of
Korean televisions.20 2 Furthermore, 20% to 40% of a Korean-made VCR
197 JOHN NAISBIT & PATRICIA ABURDENE, MEGATRENDS 2000, 200 (1990).
'9' Intel Korea: Eyeing Advanced PC Environments, ELECTRONICS KOREA, Jan. 1989, at 28.
199 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 116 (citing Lee Kark-Bum, International Division of
Labor and Small-Scale Industry: The Case of the Korean Automobile Industry, DEPENDENCY ISSUES IN
KOREAN DEVELOPMENT 429 (Kim Kyong-Dong ed., 1987)).
200 Schrage, supra note 187.
201 Stephen Kreider Yoder, Reverse "Brain-Drain" Benefits Asia But Robs US. of Scarce Talent,
ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., April 14, 1989, at 25. The brain drain continues to be a problem for Korea.
For example, 20 high-level semiconductor researchers recently left Korea for foreign firms and an
additional 40 to 50 semiconductor researchers are expected to leave in the next few months. Moreover, as
many as 400 DRAM technologists from Korea's three big semiconductor manufacturers are reported to
have been approached by foreign recruiters from the United States, Taiwanese, and Malaysian companies.
Aln Mi-Young, The Return of the Chaebol, ELECTRONIC BUSINESS ASIA (June 1999) <http://www.eb-
asia.com/registrd/issues/9906/0699c-story.htm>.
202 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41 at 114.
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consists of Japanese-made parts, °3 while the electronic industry as a whole
depends on Japan for over 70% of its component parts. 204 These statistics
indicate that Korea is dependent upon importing Japanese technology to
manufacture profitable high-tech goods.
Japan, however, is reluctant to share technology. Japanese companies
are cautious about sharing technology with other countries because they are
afraid that technology transfer might lead to the return of products using the
same technology into their own markets. 205 This is called the "boomerang"
theory.2° Consequently, Japan withholds key critical components and parts
from its Korean counterparts. 20 7 This is especially true with cutting-edge
technology. Japanese companies frequently restrict technology transfer
during the initial, most profitable "hot years" of a new product.20 Once the
novelty of the product wears off and the profit becomes marginal, Japanese
companies willingly sell their technology to Korean companies. °9 As a
result, Korea produces many goods at the low end of the market, with small
profits generated from less-sophisticated products.2 10
The price of importing Japanese technology is also increasing
dramatically. Usually, Koreans simply license Japanese technology or
purchase the rights to use Japanese patents. 211  However, the costs of
importing Japanese technology through licensed technology agreements and
royalty payments doubled from $58 million in 1977 to $115 million in
1982. 12 By 1987, the amount was up to $574 million, and in 1989, Korean
firms paid about $1.2 billion in royalty fees and fees for licensing
agreements.213 This means that the Japanese collect 10% of all Korean VCR
203 Stefan Wagstyl, South Korean Finance and Industry: Turmoil of Transition, FIN. TIMES,
November 27, 1989, at III.
204 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 149 (citing Electronics Industry Associations of Korea
(EIAK), Mar.13, 1989, at 19).
205 VOGEL, supra note 81, at 58-60.
206 Id.
207 Imports Caught Between Competing Interests, ELECTRONICS KOREA, June 1989, at 22. Lee In-
Duck, manager of Daewoo Electronics Audio Marketing Department, states that "Japanese makers are
reluctant to supply key parts and components to their Korean counterparts." Id. See also Michael Schrage,
supra note 187. Moreover, instead of selling cutting edge technology to Korea, many Japanese engineers
and technicians fly into Seoul to "moonlight" for Korean electronics companies on the weekends. Id.
208 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 4 1, at 150.
209 id.
210 Id. For example, Korea dominates the less-sophisticated black-and-white television market
worldwide. Schrage, supra note 187.
2, BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 4 1, at 113.
212 Id. at 114-55 (citing Park Tai-Won, Higher Education and Technological Innovation in Economic
Development of Korea, Pacific Focus (Inha University, Intone, Korea) Fall 1986, at 1I).2'1 d. at 115.
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sales214 and from 35 to 45% of the gross profit from Korean computer
equipment sales.215 The high prices that Japanese firms charge to license
their technology eliminate most of the limited profits that Korea is able to
realize from selling products at the low end of the market.
216
Because of the high prices Korean firms pay for foreign technology
and the marginal profits generated at the low end of the market, Korean
firms come to rely on cheap labor to keep the price of their goods
competitive. Cheap wages and long working hours were critical to Korea's
development because in East Asia, export competitiveness was highly
dependent upon low-cost, disciplined labor.217  Cheap labor and
manufacturing efficiency offset the high prices Korean firms paid for
Japanese technology and the low profits Korean firms earned from selling
less-sophisticated products. The Korean chaebols were successful largely
because they integrated borrowed technology with large-scale manufacturing
processes made use of cheap labor.218 Cheap labor and manufacturing
efficiency were responsible for the success of Korean export industries in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 2 19  Consequently, without cheap labor, Korean
chaebol profitability is limited in the highly competitive, technology driven
global market place.
4. HAN Project
Because the Korean government has limited resources and has
reduced its investments in research and development, Korea has been forced
to develop domestic technology in only a few strategic industries.22' To
develop these technologies, the Korean government implemented and
oversaw the Highly Advanced National ("HAN") Project.2 1  The HAN
214 Electronics Spells Profits and Problems, ELECTRONICS KOREA, Nov. 1989, at 29.
21' ASIAWEEK, Aug. 11, 1989, at 56.
216 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 4 1, at 115.
217 Deyo, supra note 41, at 183.
218 BELLO & ROSENFELD, supra note 41, at 117.
219 Id. at 164.
220 Yu, supra note 184, at 92.
221 The HAN project is a ten-year plan implemented by the Korean Ministry of Science and
Technology in 1992. Korean Highly Advanced National (HAN) Project, ASIAN TECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION PROGRAM (Aug. 6, 1994) <http://www.cs.arizona.edu/japan/atip/public/atip.reports.94/
koreahan.94a.html>. The total estimated budget of the HAN project is 4.9 trillion won (about $6.8 billion
U.S.) Yu, supra note 184, at 94. Korean government funding supports approximately 50% the HAN
Project's total budget and the remaining 50% is funded by the private sector. Id. The HAN Project has
also been commonly referred to as the "G-7 Project" and the "Science and Technology Development Plan
to Join the Rank of the 7 Most Advanced Countries." Id. at 93. Coincidentally, the word HAN is also used
to refer to "the people of Korea." Yu, supra note 184, at 115 n.5.
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project was designed to develop technologies in select fields that have the
greatest potential to make Korea competitive with advanced countries in the
international market. 222 The HAN Project selected two types of development
projects: Product-Oriented Technology Development Projects and Base
Technology Development Projects.223
Product Oriented Technology Development Projects concern seven
specific high-technology products that have a major share of the world
market. These projects include technology development in the electronics,
telecommunication, computer, automobile, and chemical industries. 224 For
example, in the automobile industry the Product Oriented Technology
Development Projects encourages research and development in technologies
related to crash safety, exhaust gas control, new engine designs for
alternatives to fuel, and improved chassis design.225
In contrast, Base Technology Development Projects promote generic,
base technologies that are aimed at increasing the quality of life for
humankind.226 Unlike Product Oriented Technology Development Projects,
the development of specific projects is not required.227 However, research
and development is limited to seven areas: machinery, bioengineering, the
environment, energy, human engineering, materials, and atomic power.228
C. A Suggestion For Future Technology Development in Korea
The HAN Project is an attempt by the Korean government to develop
technology domestically. However, the HAN project is confined to specific
technologies in certain areas and does not attempt to upgrade technology in
every industry.229  The Korean government should enact additional
technology development programs to promote further domestic
technological innovation and reduce Korea's dependency on technology
from Japan.
In order for the Korean government to solve the country's labor
problems without repealing existing progressive labor laws, it must take
steps to develop domestic technology in industries other than those
industries supported by the HAN project. Additional programs should be
222 Korean Highly Advanced National (HAN) Project, supra note 221.
223 Id. For an additional discussion on the HAN project see Yu, supra note 184, at 93.
224 Korean Highly Advanced National (HAN) Project, supra note 221.
225 Id.
226 id.
,227 Id.
228 Id. See also Yu, supra note 184, at 94.
229 Korean Highly Advanced National ("HAN") Project, supra note 221.
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implemented because Korean chaebols are comprised of many companies in
a variety of different industries. One Korean government report indicates
that the top thirty Korean chaebols have an average of twenty-one
companies and are involved in twenty major business lines. 230 The failure of
one company in a specific industry affects the prosperity of the entire
chaebol.231 By implementing additional technology development programs,
Korean chaebols can increase profits even with the reduced worker
productivity that has resulted from the regulated Korean workweek.
One possible approach to developing more domestic technological
innovation in Korea is through partnerships with multinational corporations
("MNCs") and foreign research institutions. Singapore has been successful
with a similar strategy for developing domestic technological innovation.
Singapore also had a need to develop technology domestically.23 2 Singapore
has developed partnerships with MNCs and has encouraged MNCs and
research institutions to use Singapore as their regional technology basis
center in the Asia-Pacific region.2 3  For example, Singapore's Economic
Development Board entered into a joint venture between Texas Instruments,
Hewlett Packard, and Canon to set up a new $330 million advanced
semiconductor factory in Singapore to design high-tech sixteen megabyteD 234
DRAM computer chips. In addition, Sony Precision Engineering
Corporation now uses Singapore as its technology basis center to serve other
corporations in the Pacific Rim region.235 These projects are allowing
Singapore to develop domestic technology.
Korea could focus on technology partnerships in which MNCs and
foreign research institutions are encouraged to set-up research and
230 Laxmi Nakarmi, A Flying Leap Toward the 21' Century? Pressure from Competitors and Seoul
may Transform the Chaebol, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2228689. For example, the
Samsung chaebol manufactures everything from t-shirts, to ships, to semiconductors. Id.
231 This is illustrated by the Daewoo Group. The Daewoo chaebol manufactured ships, cars, and
consumer electronics. The cumulative effects of high debt and labor disputes in the shipbuilding sector
threatened to bankrupt the entire chaebol. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
232 See Poh-Kam Wong, Singapore's Technology Strategy in THE EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL
TRAJECTORY OF THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 176, at 103.
233 Id. at 121.
2 Id.; see also Paul Sherer, Texas Instruments Decides to Abort Thailand Ventures, WALL ST. J.,
May 9, 1997, at A 12. Moreover, MNCs continue to invest in other Asian countries. Texas Instruments
also announced that it would build a $1.2 billion digital signal processing plant in Taiwan. Macabe Keliher,
TI to Invest U.S.$Jb in Taiwan, Make it the Asian Base, Bus. TIMES, May 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL
18750093.
235 Wong, supra note 232, at 103. Sony Precision Engineering Corporation announced that it will
merge six group companies into its Singapore headquarter base. Among the group companies being
merged are: Sony International, Sony Logistics, and Sony Precision Engineering Center. Company Will
Merge 6 Group Companies in Singapore on 1-10-99, EXTEL Co. NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, available in 1999
WL 27450685.
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development institutions in Korea. To make South Korea more attractive to
foreign MNCs, the Korean government could enter into the joint ventures
with the MNCs in order to share risk and to gain access to cutting edge
technology. This may encourage MNCs to initiate joint research projects
with other local Korean firms and government institutions. MNCs and
research institutions could also use South Korea as their regional business
technology center in the ASEAN region.
Similarly, Korea should enter into more joint ventures with MNCs
and research and development institutions. Such joint ventures agreements
would allow Korea to develop domestic technology in different industries
aside from those covered by the HAN project. Moreover, joint ventures
agreements would thwart Korea's dependency on importing Japanese
technology, consequently making Korean chaebols more profitable.
V. CONCLUSION
South Korea must make difficult decisions concerning the country's
labor problem. For decades, the Korean government and chaebols have
abused the workforce in order to promote export-oriented industrialization.
However, once South Korea became a democracy, the Korean workforce
unionized and a powerful labor movement developed. As a consequence,
significant improvements were made to labor conditions. The democratic
government's new progressive labor laws give workers the same, and in
some instances better, rights and privileges than workers in other
industrialized countries. However, these labor rights did not come without a
price. Korean businesses, which relied on cheap labor and high worker
productivity to remain competitive in exporting goods, now face
substantially lower profits and in some cases even bankruptcy. As a result,
the Korean government is caught in the middle of an intense struggle
between laborers and businesses over the regulation of the workweek.
It is highly unlikely that the Korean government will repeal the new
labor laws in order to solve the country's labor problems. The Korean
workforce is too militant and would probably engage in massive protest
strikes. Moreover, Korea is under considerable pressure from other
industrialized countries and international organizations to keep its
progressive labor laws.
Korea should focus on increasing domestic technological innovation
in order to balance the competing interests between Korean businesses and
workers. Domestic technological innovation would increase business
profitability under the regulated workweek because it would limit the
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dependence of Korean business on technology importation. The HAN
project is a strong attempt by the government to reach this goal. However,
more should be done to increase domestic technological innovation in all of
Korea's key industries. To do this, Korea should also adopt technology
development programs similar to those adopted by Singapore. By entering
into partnerships with MNCs and other research institutions, the government
can increase domestic technological development. Moreover, such
programs would encourage MNCs to use Korea as a base to serve the rest of
the Pacific Rim. Such domestic technological programs are one way to
resolve the conflict between progressive labor standards and the profitability
and viability of Korean business.
